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The Profession of iT 
Don’t Feel Bad if you 
Can’t Predict the Future 
Wise experts and powerful machines are no match for chaotic events and  
human declarations. Beware of their predictions and be humble in your own.
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have faced many times as a profession-
al, on being asked to make forecasts. 
When can I offer forecasts that others 
can trust? When should I refrain?
the Work of Futurists
I began by inquiring into the work 
of the professionals who get paid for 
their forecasts.2 Forecasting the fu-
ture became a profession in the 1940s. 
Most professional futurists see their 
mission as investigating how social, 
T
he  M aChiN e ThaT would pre-
dict the future.” An article of 
that title appeared in the De-
cember 2011 issue of Scien-
tific American. It suggested 
that advances in big data and super-
computing will finally enable the old 
dream of an automated oracle. It set 
me to reflecting on what machines we 
already have available for forecasting 
and what our track record is with them. 
It also reminded me of a predicament I 
demographic, economic, and techno-
logical developments will shape the 
future. They advise on global trends, 
plausible scenarios, emerging market 
opportunities, and risk management. 
They are heavy users of information 
technology. Futurists rely on three 
main methods.
Revelation of current realities. Of-
ten we are oblivious or blind to what is 
going on around us. We operate with 
interpretations of the world that are 
unsupported by evidence. Futurists 
gather data and propose new interpre-
tations grounded in that data. They 
then examine how policy and action 
might change to align with the reality. 
For many people, simply showing them 
what is already going on around them 
is a revelation of the future to them.
Peter Drucker was a master at this. 
His book The New Realities (Harper 
Business, 1989) is loaded with exam-
ples. In his chapter “When the Russian 
Empire Is Gone,” he analyzed econom-
ic data, conversations of politicians 
and the media, and moods of Soviet 
citizens to conclude that the Soviet 
Union would soon fall. It did—within 
a year of the book’s publication, even 
sooner than he expected.
Drucker was once asked what his 
method of forecasting was. He replied 
that he made no forecasts. He simply 
looked at the current realities and told 
people what the consequences are. 
When pressed to make long-term fore-
casts, he offered probability estimates 
based on past history.
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Modeling. A model is a set of equa-
tions or simulations that take some 
observed variables (parameters) of a 
system and compute other values (met-
rics). A validated model is one whose 
track record shows consistently good 
agreement between computed and 
actual metrics. A validated model can 
be used for forecasting by declaring 
that its assumptions will still be valid 
in the future time period, and setting 
its parameters to the values expected 
in the future period. The forecast will 
be in error if model assumptions do 
not hold or if parameter estimates are 
incorrect. Such models have long been 
used in the sciences and engineering 
to describe natural recurrences.
Trend extrapolation is one of the 
simplest models. When a trend can be 
detected in some measure of perfor-
mance, futurists can calculate future 
values and draw conclusions about the 
consequences. In 1965 Gordon Moore, 
a cofounder of Intel Corporation, no-
ticed an 18-month doubling trend in 
the development of computer circuits 
(“Cramming More Components into 
Integrated Circuits,” in Electronics 
Magazine 38, April 1965). That is a 100-
fold speedup for the same price over a 
decade. An industry rule of thumb is 
that any technology change that pro-
vides a 10-fold speedup can usher in 
a disruptive change. Many entrepre-
neurs started using the law to gauge 
whether their proposed disruptive 
technologies would be supportable by 
the computing power available in a few 
years. Moore’s Law became a guiding 
business model that has sustained the 
computer chip industry for nearly 50 
years. It has started to break down as 
a trend because the sizes of transistors 
and wires are approaching a few atoms 
each, too small for them to function. 
Most trend analyses break down over 
longer forecast periods because even-
tually the trend encounters a limit.
In The Age of Spiritual Machines (Vi-
king, 1999), Ray Kurzweil observed the 
same doubling trend in four previous 
generations of information technolo-
gies, and he claimed it would be pres-
ent in technologies that supersede 
silicon. Based on that, he extrapolated 
Moore’s Law well into the future. He 
predicted a “singularity” around 2030, 
when he believes artificial brains will 
become intelligent.
On the other side, in The Social 
Life of Information (Harvard Business, 
2000), John Seely Brown and Paul Du-
guid warned against overconfidence in 
trend extrapolation because social sys-
tems often resist and redirect changes 
in technology. They exposed a series 
of major predictions that never hap-
pened. Belief in those predictions led 
to the dot-com bust in 2002.
Scenarios. A scenario is a story that 
lays out in some detail what the future 
might look like under certain assump-
tions about trends and other factors. 
Futurists usually offer several sce-
narios under different assumptions. 
The method is useful to help people 
see how they might react to differ-
ent futures, and then try to influence 
policies and trends so that the most 
attractive futures come to be. Futur-
ists do not offer scenarios as forecasts 
or predictions. They sometimes give 
probabilities for the various futures 
they depict.
One thing I learned from this is that 
futurists actually avoid making predic-
tions. They give you model results and 
scenarios and leave it to you to draw 
your conclusions.
expert Predictions
Despite the caution of professional 
futurists, expert predictions have ac-
quired a bad reputation. In Future 
Babble (Dutton, 2011), Dan Gardner ar-
gued that misguided trust among me-
dia forecasters in “legions of experts” 
has led many people down false paths. 
He bases his conclusions on the work 
of psychologist Philip Tetlock, who 
performed a long and careful study 
of 27,450 predictions by 284 experts 
in many fields. Tetlock found that the 
performance of experts was no better 
than random guessing. He found that 
celebrity experts tend to be worse than 
random guessing and that “humble” 
experts—like the cautious futurists—
tend to be slightly better than random. 
Consumers of these predictions tend 
to celebrate the successes and forget 
the failures.
Tetlock only evaluated predictions 
that were stated as definitively test-
able hypotheses; for example, “In five 
years, unemployment will be under 
10%.” Many expert predictions are not 
so precise. Gardner says that experts 
are even less successful with vaguely 
worded long-term hypotheses than 
with precisely worded short-term hy-
potheses.
Dave Walter presented a dramatic 
example of failed long-term forecasts 
in his book Today Then (1992). At the 
1892 Chicago Columbian Exhibition, 
the exhibitors speculated about how 
electricity, telephony, and automo-
biles would bring peace and prosperity 
in the coming century. The American 
Press Association invited 74 leading 
authors, journalists, industrialists, 
business leaders, engineers, social 
critics, lawyers, politicians, religious 
leaders, and other luminaries of the 
day to pen their forecasts of the world 
after 100 years.
The 1892 forecasters believed that 
in 1992 railroads and pneumatic 
tubes would be the primary means of 
transportation, governments would 
be smaller, and increased commerce 
would end wars. None foresaw the in-
terstate highway system, genetic engi-
neering, quantum physics, universal 
health care, mass state-sponsored ed-
ucation, broadcast TV and radio—or 
the computer. Walter concluded that 
many modern expert predictions are 
no more reliable than these.
Prediction machines 
Prediction machines are machines 
that forecast the future with reason-
able accuracy. They are nothing mys-
terious. In almost every case they are 
validated models being applied for 
future conditions. How well have such 
machines done to date? Can they do 
better than experts?
Mathematical models of physi-
our problems  
with forecasts  
arise when  
we wrongly believe 
model assumptions 
or parameter 
forecasts will  
be valid.
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earlier envisions a project to build a 
computing system with more stor-
age and computing power than ever 
before, connected globally to sensors 
and personal information. With new 
data mining methods to be developed, 
the system would find correlations in 
the data, and use them for predictions. 
Despite the soaring rhetoric, the sys-
tem is no more likely to be successful 
than any other prediction machine, 
except when it can find and validate re-
currences. It is unlikely to be success-
ful whenever the outcome can depend 
on human declarations or unpredict-
able events.
Conclusion 
We seek technology predictions in an 
attempt to reduce our risks, losses, 
and missed opportunities. We do so 
against great odds. Unpredictability 
arises not from insufficient informa-
tion about a system’s operating laws, 
from inadequate processing power, 
or from limited storage. It arises be-
cause the system’s outcomes depend 
on unpredictable events and human 
declarations. Do not be fooled into 
thinking that wise experts or powerful 
machines can overcome such odds.
If you are called on to make fore-
casts, do so with great humility. Make 
sure your models are validated and 
that their assumed recurrences fit the 
world you are forecasting. Ground 
your speculations in observable data, 
or else label them as opinion. Be skep-
tical about your ability to make longer-
term predictions, even with the best of 
models. Do not worry about the fore-
casts made by experts—they are no 
better than forecasts you can make.
Often, the most powerful and useful 
statement you can make when asked 
for a prediction is: “I don’t know.” 
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cal processes are the most success-
ful examples.1 Newtonian models of 
planetary motion give highly reliable 
predictions of the future positions of 
planets, asteroids, comets, and man-
made vehicles. Jay Forrester’s system 
dynamics models were very reliable 
for material and information flows 
in industrial plants. Queueing net-
work models have been very reliable 
for forecasting throughputs and re-
sponse times of communication net-
works and assembly lines. Finite ele-
ment models have been very reliable 
for determining whether airplanes 
will fly or buildings will withstand 
earthquakes.
The common feature of these physi-
cal models is that they describe and 
exploit natural recurrences—laws of 
nature. We can assume that Newto-
nian physics, system feedback loops, 
congestion at bottleneck queues, and 
forces in rigid structures will continue 
to behave the same way in the future. 
We do not have to worry that the as-
sumptions of the model will be invalid.
Our problems with forecasts arise 
when we wrongly believe model as-
sumptions or parameter forecasts will 
be valid. In other words, we assume a 
recurrence that will not happen.
Many things can invalidate our as-
sumptions of recurrences: human 
declarations in social systems, chaotic, 
or low-probably disruptive events, in-
herently complex systems whose rules 
of operation are unknown, complex 
adaptive systems whose rules change, 
environmental changes that invali-
date key assumptions, and unantici-
pated interactions especially those 
never before seen. This list is hardly 
exhaustive.
Of these, I think the first is the most 
underappreciated. Human social sys-
tems are networks of commitments, 
and most commitments ultimately 
follow from human declarations. The 
timing and nature of declarations is 
unpredictable. Whether a technology 
is adopted or sustained in a commu-
nity depends on the support of its so-
cial structure and belief systems, both 
of which resulted from previous dec-
larations.3 Seely Brown and Duguid, 
mentioned earlier, give numerous ex-
amples of technology forecasts foiled 
by human declarations.
We know from experience that 
many validated models deteriorate 
over time. A locality principle is at 
work: the model assumptions are less 
likely to change over a short period 
than over a long period. Our short-
range predictions are better than our 
long-range predictions. As a conse-
quence, we need to frequently revali-
date models to maintain our confi-
dence that they still apply to at least 
the current circumstances.
What about long-term predictions? 
Most often, they are just flat-out wrong, 
as in the examples Dan Gardner and 
Dave Walter gave us. Occasionally they 
are correct but way off in the timing. 
Researchers at MIT predicted in the 
1960s that computer utilities—fore-
runners of today’s “cloud”—would be 
common by the 1980s; they were off 
by 30 years. Alan Kay predicted in the 
1970s that personal computers would 
revolutionize computing; he was off by 
20 years. Alan Turing in 1950 speculat-
ed that conversation machines would, 
by the year 2000, have a 70% chance 
of fooling a human for more than five 
minutes.4 He also thought that memo-
ry capacity for the machine’s database 
would be the main obstacle. By 2012, 
our natural language systems are not 
close to this goal even though we have 
the memory capacity—but maybe in a 
few more years they will.
The few long-range predictions that 
do succeed late give us a forlorn hope 
that we can at least get the outcome 
right, even if the timing is off.
Nevertheless, the dream of good 
prediction by machine lives on. That 
Scientific American article mentioned 
We seek technology 
predictions in  
an attempt to reduce 
our risks, losses,  
and missed 
opportunities.  
We do so against 
great odds.
